I analyse the exploratory function of two main modelling practices: targetless fictional models and hypothetical perspectival models. In both cases, I argue, modelers invite us to imagine or conceive something about the target system, which is either known to be non-existent (fictional models) or just hypothetical (in perspectival models). I clarify the kind of imagining or conceiving involved in each modelling practice, and I show how each-in its own right-delivers important modal knowledge. I illustrate these two kinds of exploratory models with Maxwell's ether model and SUSY models at the LHC.
Introduction
Much of the literature on scientific modelling has concentrated on an important cluster of inter-related topics concerning what a model is, and how models represent, just to mention two examples. Yet there is an important function of scientific modelling that has received far less attention in the philosophical literature until recently: their exploratory function (see Gelfert 2016 for a recent re-appraisal).
1
The exploratory function of scientific models has traditionally been regarded as part and parcel of their representational function. On the received view, models fulfil their exploratory function by offering abstract and idealized representations of their target systems.
In this paper, I argue that there is more to the exploratory function of scientific models than the received view has suggested so far. Some scientific models fulfil their exploratory function not necessarily by offering idealised yet accurate and veridical representations of the target system. In important contexts and circumstances, some scientific models fulfil their exploratory function by inviting us instead to imagine or conceive non-veridical scenarios about the target system so as to deliver modal knowledge about what is possible. Two modelling practices are exemplary in this respect. Following Michael Weisberg's (2013) terminology, let us label them as follows:
1 Gelfert (2016, 83-97) describes exploratory models as fulfilling four distinct (not exhaustive) functions: (1) starting point for future inquiry; (2) they feature in proof-of-principle demonstrations; (3) they generate potential explanation of observed (type of) phenomena; (4) or lead to assessments of the suitability of the target. In this paper I'd like to add two further functions to this list: (5) delivering knowledge of causal possibilities; and (6) delivering knowledge of objective possibilities for hypothetical entities.
(1) Targetless modeling: scientific models without a target system. Within this practice, fictional models, i.e. models of knowingly false and non-existent entities (along the lines of Bokulich 2009 Bokulich , 2016 2 are particularly interesting.
(2) Hypothetical modeling: scientific models whose target system is hypothetical. Within this practice, perspectival models are an important family of incompatible (or even inconsistent) models for the same target system (along the lines of Giere 2006 , Rueger 2005 , Morrison 2011 , and Massimi 2018 conceiving something about the target system is key to clarifying how models deliver important modal knowledge in science, notwithstanding false posits, fictional targets, or purely hypothetical entities they postulate.
2 Frigg (2010) distinguishes two meanings for fictional models: (1) fiction as imagination; and (2) fiction as falsity, or nonexistence. Frigg himself endorses (1). Other authors (e.g. Bokulich) rely on (2), which is also how I am going to use the term here. Some philosophers of science have taken the highly abstract and idealized nature of the representation afforded by models as the sign that fictionalism is the correct ontology of scientific modeling (no matter whether its target system is real, or hypothetical, or simply non-existent) qua make-believe games along Kendall Walton's theory. In what follows, I am not interested in fictionalism as an ontology of modeling. I am interested instead in what kind of modal knowledge scientists can obtain from models whose target system is known to be false and non-existent, i.e. I use fiction as in (2). 3 The class of "perspectival models" as inconsistent models for the same target system spans across both hypothetical models and concrete models. Different models for the atomic nucleus (quark models, cluster models, shell model, liquid drop models) can be regarded as perspectival models for a target system known to exist and be real (the nucleus)-see Morrison (2011) . Different models for supersymmetric particles (my example in what follows) can be regarded as perspectival models for a hypothetical target system (i.e., supersymmetric particles that have been hypothesised but not yet discovered as of today). 4 Some philosophers of science have taken the highly abstract and idealized nature of scientific modeling as a springboard for re-evaluating the explanatory importance of falsehoods in science (e.g., Bokulich 2009 Bokulich , 2016 . Others have taken the ubiquitous use of false-yet-explanatory models as the sign that the aim of science is to offer non-factive understanding, rather than truth (see Elgin 2017; Potochnik 2017 In this case, the modal gap is filled via subjunctive conditionals that feature in bootstrapped inferences, without any essential-property ascription.
How targetless fictional models act as a guide to what is causally possible
That fictional models can be a guide to what is causally possible is not a foregone conclusion. For how can a model of a knowingly false (or fictional) target system be expected to deliver knowledge at all? In this Section I argue that fictional models can in fact act as a guide to knowledge of causal possibilities in interesting and unexpected ways. Targetless fictional models, I maintain, invite scientists to physically conceive non-veridical scenarios about a non-existent target system. The goal is to allow scientists to explore possible causal mechanisms behind a given phenomenon of interest, for which the non-existent fictional target provides a proxy. But what is physical conceivability, to start with?
Physical conceivability is a kind of epistemic conceivability (along the lines of Yablo 1993) that is consistent with known laws of nature. Here is a first stab at a definition:
p is physically conceivable for an epistemic subject S (or an epistemic community C) if S's (or C's) imagining that p not only complies with the state of knowledge and conceptual resources of S (or C) but it is also consistent with the laws of nature known by S (or C).
In targetless fictional models, scientists often conceive properties and relations in a given nonexistent target system. Their goal is to identify a possible causal mechanism behind a given phenomenon that the fictional target system is a proxy for. This conceivability exercise is driven by laws of nature in that some of the properties and relations attributed to the fictional target system mimic analogically properties and relations that-according to known laws of natureare typically attributed to non-fictional, concrete target systems that serve as template for the fictional models.
Consider, for example, Maxwell's honeycomb model of the ether, which assumed an ether with hexagonal vortices that by rotating generated a magnetic field (whose strength was assumed to be proportional to the angular velocity of the vortices). 5 This is how Maxwell (1861/2, pp. 13-14 and 21) presented his model: "we may conceive that the electricity in each molecule is so displaced that one side is rendered positively, and the other negatively electrical, but that the electricity remains entirely connected with the molecules …I have deduced from this result …that the elasticity of the magnetic medium in air is the same as that of the luminiferous medium, if these two coexistent, coextensive, and equally elastic media are not rather one medium…. we can scarcely avoid the inference that light consists in the transverse undulations of the same medium which is the cause of electric and magnetic phenomena."
By physically conceivingLD of an ether with the essential properties of hexagonal cylinders and idle wheels, Maxwell's fictional model could explore the possible causal mechanism for electromagnetic induction. The model did not identify the ether as the causal mechanism. For the model was not meant to be an accurate or veridical representation of any actual or even possible state of affairs in nature. Instead, the model allowed to explore the phenomenon of electromagnetic induction by ascribing some essential properties to a fictional target that could be used as a proxy to understand how for example a magnetic field might causally induce electric current in a wire (e.g. how strong the magnetic field would have to be for electric displacement to be generated; whether the electric displacement would depend on the nature of the dielectric; and so on). The exploratory nature of Maxwell's model consisted in its ability to deliver useful modal knowledge about causal possibilities through an exercise of physically conceivingLD a knowingly non-existent entity (ether) as having some essential properties and relations, and see how far the analogy with water's vortex motion could lead. This is modal knowledge gained via analogical reasoning with concrete models.
But this exercise has also its glaring limits. Analogical reasoning with concrete models can lead to misleading essential property attribution. For example, the fictional ether got ascribed some classical quantities (e.g. momentum) in analogy with fluid motion, as if momentum were a kinematic property of structural bearers inside the ether (be it vortices, gyroscopes or else) rather than a dynamical property of the electromagnetic field. This misleading essential property attribution led to the failure of an entire tradition of mechanical models of the ether in the nineteenth century; and it reveals the shaky foundations on which this exercise in physical conceivabilityLD rested. Taking heat flow or fluid flow as an analogue upon which to model property ascription to the electromagnetic field had its limits, as the history of ether models in the nineteenth century shows. Nonetheless, the physical conceivabilityLD afforded by ether models turned out to be crucial in the exploratory process that led to the development of electromagnetic theory.
How hypothetical perspectival models act as a guide to what is objectively possible
representation as an account that is meant to encompass scientific representation in all sorts of models (not just targetless fictional ones). As it will become clear in the next Section, other kinds of models may resort to different representational strategies.
And it is not just targetless fictional models that deliver important modal knowledge in science.
Hypothetical perspectival models prove equally pivotal to exploring what might be the case in nature. This is well exemplified by the bewildering plurality of hypothetical models currently employed by particle physicists to search for supersymmetric particles. Long theorized to fill some gaps in the current Standard Models (e.g. the naturalness problem, among others), This is exemplarily illustrated by models of supersymmetric particles at the LHC. One of the most difficult tasks for the particle physics community at the LHC is to devise modelling techniques that by conceiving of hypothetical SUSY particles as being thus-and-so (within broad nomological constraints) can provide an effective method for hunting them (assuming they 9 Let us be clear again on this point. One might retort that surely any SUSY model is bound to ascribe some essential properties to these hypothetical entities. For example, a model point 10407816 (fine-tuned 57) might be said to ascribe to the hypothetical SUSY particle called Higgsino the property of having mass 4000 GeV. This objection, however, misses the main point here. Namely, it is not the primary task of pMSSM-19 model points to ascribe essential properties to these hypothetical entities (which for all we know as of today might well turn out to be non-existent). Instead their task is to model the possible ways in which these putative entities might exist (within broad theoretical and experimental constraints). Most importantly, such modelling is not downstream of any prior knowledge of essential properties (precisely because physicists as of today do not even know whether these putative entities exist or not; a fortiori they are not inferring their possible ways of existing from any prior essential-property-ascription). (Fig. 1a) . Reproduced under Open Access CC BY 4.0.
Further Run 2 analyses from proton-proton collisions at LHC are likely to trim down the number of possible surviving model points even further. And the question that looms large for the future of LHC is how to go about probing higher-energy regions, which are currently not accessible within the LHC energy regimes.
Scientists might have very good theoretical reasons for thinking that SUSY particles exist (i.e. naturalness problem, hierarchy problem, among others). They might have very sophisticated modelling practices for exploring what might be objectively possible. But ultimately, it is only incoming new experimental evidence that constrains and bootstrappingly refines the howpossible inferences so as to make more and more educated guesses on which SUSY particles (if any) there might be.
Conclusion
The overarching goal of this paper was to get clear on the exploratory function of two main classes of models: targetless fictional models and hypothetical perspectival models. In both these modelling practices, the exploratory function consists in imaging or physically conceiving non-veridical scenarios about a target system which is either known to be non-existent or just hypothetical. The upshot of this exercise is to be able to explore what is either causally or objectively possible. And the procedures through which fictional models and perspectival models respectively deliver kinds of modal knowledge is either via property ascription to a fictional target (acting as a proxy for a phenomenon of interest) or via bootstrapped howpossible inferences that get refined as more evidence becomes available. In either case, this is yet another powerful illustration of how models are able to carve out the space of what is possible, notwithstanding their false or hypothetical posits.
